Week 6: Intervention and the everyday politics of development

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There are so many humanitarian interventions going on in the Global South but one of them which I have never taken notice of prior to this lecture was Haiti although I am aware of the devastating earthquake that struck in 2010. But in another phase, I noticed in the lecture the tension between a short-term humanitarian assistant and a long-term development programme. Then, I was poised to ask myself how many of these interventions carried out follow the do no harm principles when they intervene as articulated in (Anderson, 1999). So, even though I understood the moral and good side of providing aid and services in emergency situations. However, today’s lecture had informed me clearly on how important it is for foreign donors to incorporate a longer-term development programme while delivering emergency services and reconstruction in such a situation.

The case study of Haiti demonstrated a vivid picture of this intervention dilemma in that the NGOs provision of free services, wage inflation and more (Garret, 2007) was against the need of the community as a whole because of its effect on ‘small Haitian private companies and individuals who traditionally provided many of these services’ (Oxfam, 2011:12). Thus, as good as it is may have appeared, however, the NGOs actions undermined the socio-political and economic situation of the country coupled with the failure to incorporate the local communities which could have helped in facilitating a longer-term development programme.

Indeed, the tension of combining both emergency relief and development is not easy but since there are certain NGOs specialised in different fields, it would be worthwhile to suggest that they use their different skills to work together and engage the community for a long-term development strategy that will be of benefit to the Haitian community at large.

REFERENCES

Anderson, M. (1999). Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner)

Garrett, L. (2007) “The Challenge of Global Health”. Foreign Affairs, 86 (1): 14-38.

Oxfam (2011) From Relief to Recovery: Supporting Good Governance in Post-Earthquake Haiti.

Week 10: Authoritarianism and the International politics of development

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It was clear in today’s session that the third wave of democratisation does not indeed mean the end of authoritarianism. Rather what we are ironically seeing is the resurgence of authoritarianism (Diamond 2008) and resistance towards a democratic trajectory. This is true because even after the Arab spring, we still see some outlook and remnants of authoritarian rule embedded in their institutions especially Egypt while some are just mere window dressing of democracy. On this note, it shows that the political conditionality of democracy by Western donors on the Global South in terms of achieving a sustainable road to development has been slow. But I have understood that countries in the Global South are quite sceptical about the democracy aid because the intentions of the West are not entirely altruistic.

if the Global North and other international organisations claim that democracy promotion is the reason for Western aid, why do western donors and other nongovernmental donors give aid to authoritarian states more than democratic states despite their Human rights violation? Indeed, money answereth all things. However, I understood that one of the possible reasons although contentious is because of the increasing level of poverty and the impacts of conflict on the people in authoritarian countries.

In addition to that also is the fact that we live in a multipolar world full of competition so despite their public rhetoric it is worth stressing that Western donors do not always deliver aid for democracy promotion. Often times, it is because of their national interest like militarily, politically and economically. See, video clip.

Similarly, I was surprised that autocratic states do also support autocratic regimes in ways that are similar to those of the Western states, which is quite interesting. Not necessarily in the promotion of autocracy per se (Vanderhill, 2013) but instead on preserving regional stability (Bader, 2015). No wonder China has been indirectly assisting African countries regardless of their regime so as to expand its global economy and influence in the world. And if it continues in this manner then the West idea of promoting democracy through aid will just be lips service rather than anything substantial.

REFERENCES

  • Bader, J. (2015). “Propping up Dictators? Economic Cooperation from China and its Impact on Authoritarian Persistence in Party and Non-Party Regimes”, European Journal of Political Research, 54 (4): 655-672.
  • Diamond, L. (2008). The democratic rollback. The Resurgence of the Predatory State. {Online} Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2008-03-02/democratic-rollback. Foreign Affairs (Accessed 5th Dec. 2018).
  • Press TV (2017).US considering more aid to Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf allies. [online] Available at: https://youtu.be/_HhOCb3AHZU. [Accessed 5 Dec. 2018].
  • Vanderhill, R. (2013). Promoting authoritarianism abroad. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

 

 

 

Week 5: Thinking and working politically: The challenge of supporting democratization

 

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Our case study for some weeks now in relation to development in the Global South has centred broadly and majorly on Africa, which indeed has been worthwhile. However, today’s lecture demonstrated a sharp departure from the continent to an interesting topic on democratisation in Asia, precisely Burma. Where the current state of democracy has been murky. That said, I have understood in principle that democracy is not a bad idea, after all, democracies arguably do not go to war with each other. But even at that, it should not be a matter of force, imposing one’s traditions or customs on another Host country. That is why the effort of proliferating democracy in the Global South (Bush, 2015) by the North has been pushed back because of its biases. They hypocritically select which countries to promote democracy and overlook some because of their strategic and geopolitical interest in security and Oil.

Notwithstanding, the case study of Burma is an interesting one after 25 years of conflict under an authoritarian rule. The 2015 election was seen by donors as a stepping stone to democracy but not without its flaws as the minority populations living in conflict areas were not allowed to vote (Huang, 2017). Indeed, the step towards a democratic trajectory will not always be smooth. Notably, the military still retained its position in government as an ‘ultimate disciplinarian in Myanmar’s democracy’ (Huang, 2017), sharing powers with the civilian. But despite its fragility, donors have not stopped from pushing for democracy assistance as Carothers (1999) strongly puts it; “Democracy support is good for speeding up a moving train” (Carothers, 1999). As such, Burma should be supported with democracy aid since it is already on the path of change from an authoritarian rule to democracy.

But, I wondered during the seminar if it was the right call by DFID to focus largely on assisting Burma with electoral support (September 2014), while neglecting the military and political parties. Understandably, it may not have been the right call and they should have recognised them so as not to provoke another conflict. Albeit, I do not think there is any silver bullet in addressing the case of Burma as a donor, the current persecution against the Rohingya throws the agenda of democracy support into questions. And has inspired me to start thinking and working politically beyond the periphery of elections.

REFERENCES

  • Bush, S.S. (2015). ‘Introduction’ in The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 3-21
  • Carothers, T. (1999). Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • Huang, R.L. (2017). Myanmar’s Way to Democracy and the Limits of the 2015 Elections.  Asian Journal of Political Science25(1): 25–44.
  • (September 2014).Business Case and Intervention Summary: Programme for Democratic Change in Burma.

Week 8: Social and Religious movements: Algeria and the Arab Spring

 

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This session unravelled the historic events that took place in 2011 across North Africa and the Middle East which is known as the ‘Arab Spring Revolutions’. An event that took many protagonists and scholars by surprise in a great deal, unlike the previous revolutions in the ’80s and 90s that was propelled by an Islamist paradigm. The uniqueness of these revolutions was met with the massive involvements of young activists and tech-savvy activists. (Durac, 2013). The authoritarian model of governance perpetuated in these countries provoked the mobilisation of these young people to demand a democratic governance. Due to poor social development and repression. To this end, their temerity led to the toppling of some autocrats in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. This exercise alone informs me of how important it is not to neglect the youth in society as well as in the political discourses.

Although fundamental to this uprisings was the role religious activists played in instigating such a political move for change. Undoubtedly, there was an element of religious involvement in it, directly or indirectly although not for the sake of Islamic ideology. Bayat pointed out that some pious Mulisms consolidated the efforts of the young people alongside seculars, leftists, nationalist and non-muslims by preaching about the prospect of Post-Islamism. (Bayat, 2013). A post-revolutionary plan that appears to politicise religion by mixing Islam and Democracy (Freedom, Social Justice and Dignity). Even though that was not what the people opted for, but because of the prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood and a lack of a post-revolutionary plan. The people bought into the reformist ideology.

It is against this ideological transformation (Wegner, 2017), that saw arguably the rise of Islamic parties assuming the parliamentary and governmental power instead of the revolutionaries themselves. However, with the current situation of conflict in the Middle East where the politicisation of religion is at its helm since the revolution. I will advocate for the depoliticisation of religion in any post-revolutionary plan because it fuels conflict. And advocate for a programme that will help the people fulfil their potentials as they recover from the revolution.

REFERENCES

Week 7: Elections and Service delivery

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This session broadened my horizon on the interplay between elections and service delivery.  During the lecture, it was an eyeopener to see that over the years the world has witnessed a wave of elections across the political spectrum not just in democratic countries but also in authoritarianism as well. Although this has been premised on the fact that elections deliver better options for ordinary people (Cheeseman, 2015), and as such the electorates expect the politicians to ‘pursue promised public programmes’. (Lindberg, 2003:128). As they use to say, better leaders will always promote better service delivery to its people.

But is not as black and white as thought, and it is worth pointing out that the qualities of elections thus far across the globe have remained problematic in various degrees both in the Global South and North respectively. As a result, it is not entirely fair as argued by Linz and Stepan (2016) that too much emphasis be laid on elections as the only necessary and sufficient way for democracy to flourish. (Linz and Stepan cited in Norris, Frank and Martinez, 2016).  Which is true, because it limits its potential and neglects other mechanisms that are essential in making the qualities of elections reach its full potentials. Like free media and an Independent Electoral Commission.

Albeit, to summarise the relevant points of discussion in a nutshell. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that service delivery promotes greater accountability (Lindberg, 2003 and Richard and Gelleny, 2007). But notably, it is not always and clearly because of the possibilities of vote buying and fake news. However, I do agree that often times service delivery tends to drive voters perceptions. An evidence of this was in the 2015 election in Nigeria, which saw the incumbent party defeated by the opposition party because it garnered support from the northern population where the Bokoharam fighters are heavily operating and capitalised on their plight by promising to defeat Bokoharam completely.  (Smith, 2015: The Guardian). It is against this backdrop, that we see the dark side of elections, which is the winner takes it all logic. But when the promises are not fulfilled, the tendency of political uncertainty and policy instability arises. So, unlike the authoritarian model, it will not be able to stay for a longer-term. As a result, it would be more preferable to suggest that elections be used for the right purpose to promote greater accountability rather than make fools promises that cannot be kept. And likewise, strengthen institutions that are geared toward transparency so that foreign aid for development or service delivery can be feasible and tangible.

REFERENCES

  • Cheeseman, N. (2015) Democracy in Africa (Cambridge University Press).
  • Lindberg, S. I. “‘It’s Our Time to” Chop”‘: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It?.” Democratization 10.2 (2003): 121-140.
  • Gelleny, D.R. and Richards, D. (2007). Good Things to Those Who Wait? National
    Elections and Government Respect for Human Rights. Journal of Peace Research,
    vol. 44, no. 4, 2007, pp. 505–523 Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
    and Singapore).
  • Smith, D. (2015). Nigerian election winner vows to crush Boko Haram insurgency. {Online}. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/01/nigerian-election-winner-muhammadu-buhari-boko-haram. (Accessed 16th November 2018).

Week 4: ‘Neopatrimonialism’ and the politics of ethnicity

 

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Today’s session on ‘Neopatrimonialism and the discourse between ethnicity and politics’ was quite revealing. Prior to today’s lecture, I had never heard of the concept of Neopatrimonialism before despite the works of literature laying credence to its prominence since the 80s. In light of today’s lecture, I understood vividly that ethnicity is actually the core driver of politics in the Global South. However, it is worth emphasizing in the next section that neopatrimonialism develops this premise by focusing on how the discourse works or operates in the political setting of the Global South in a great deal.

Neopatrimonialism can be defined as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines”. (Clapham cited in Mkandawire, 2015: 565). The phenomenal takes the form of an elite configuration, whereby the self-interested political leaders or the big man exercises the redistribution of resources for private gain. Not only for itself but also to appease its clientelist networks in other to retain power. But woe betides the clients if the Big man is ousted, they all lose. So, it is along this line that we envisage the political dynamics and structures of how the global South operates. As some scholars argue that; They operate in an informal and formal clientelist logic that tends to promote a personal and family clientelism network in a way that rewards people based on their ethnic affinity rather than on merits. (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). By so doing, it breeds corruption which affects governance and distorts the economic growth and development of the global South, which in turn leads to state failure in a big way. Indeed, I agree with (Bayart, Reno, Ellis and Hibou cited in Wai, 2012) that the dynamics of neopatrimonialism in the Global South is strongly endemic. And has been historically perpetuated for years leaving some groups marginalised and agitated. In fact, this was one of the causes that led to the Biafran uprising in Nigeria 1967 and Zimbabwe in 2017.

Although most relevant to point out that, this is not just peculiar or confined to the Global South. A plethora of literature has in somewhat pushed back the patrimonial narratives as bedevilling to the Global South. (See; Mamdani cited in Wai, Budd cited in Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009). While also pointing to the strong Presidentialism in Latin America even though the concept is not being used directly, however, indirectly similar features and characteristics still abound just like in Africa. Fundamentally too, is the North as well during the Bush and Clinton administrations. Therefore, politics is not entirely different from the Global South, as neopatrimonialism seem to portray it some similarities do occur and should be worth emphasising instead of narrowing it down to the Global South, thus blurring the lines.

REFERENCE

  • Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. (1994). “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”, World Politics, 46 (4): 453-489.
  • Johnston, M. Moran, H. M. and Pitcher, A. (2009). Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa. African Studies Review. Cambridge University Press. Vol. 52, No. 1. pp. 125-156
  • Mkandawire, T. (2015). “Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections”, World Politics, 67 (3): 563-612.
  • Wai, Z. (2012). “Neo-patrimonialism and the Discourse of State Failure in Africa”, Review of African Political Economy, 39 (131): 27-43.

Week 3: Urban Politics In Lagos (Nigeria)

 

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This session highlighted the importance of Urban politics in an intellectually stimulating way. Foremost, it was clear to my understanding that urbanization is highly contested in politics. Meaning that the drivers of urbanisation are different due to their geographical proximity which shapes the way they envisage it. As a result, it avoided the temptation of generalisation that could have made the concept less meaningful in its analytical purchase. Although it provided a clear and reasonable premise of urbanisation as being bigger relative to rural areas, which is often associated with ‘economic modernization, industrialisation and bureaucratization’. (Paller, 2017).

It is on this note that we see the reasons for such an overarching increase and decrease in population with regards to what Paller articulated above. But it does not mean that migrating to an urban area would automatically make one urban, in fact, as Cheeseman and de Gramont highlighted in their work; there are some negative externalities to it that might impede one’s success in an urban area such as overcrowding, violent crimes, chronic traffic jams and the like. (Cheeseman and de Gramont, 2017).

Lagos as a case study is an interesting example considering what Paller pointed out in his work which many scholars have attested to that; “urbanisation has radically transformed Africa’s political geography in an unprecedented fashion” both locally and internationally. (See; Holston, 2009:245, and Paller, 2017:163). This is evident in the research fieldwork carried out by Cheeseman and De Gramont (2017) about Lagos, which stands out as one of the top ten fastest growing urban areas in Nigeria as well as in Africa with 50% rise in population when compared to decades ago. However, more relevant is how the dynamics of urbanisation and democratisation has helped in explaining and maintaining the Lagos population growth. The relationship between Fashola and Tinubu is an interesting observation that shows how unified the political elites are towards making Lagos a mega city open for investment and innovation. And because Lagos is not dependent on the national government for public funds,  I would imagine why people always tended to vote for the opposition party than the ruling party. Interestingly, here is a short video clip of their campaign demonstrating how plausible this has ever been since the regime of Tinubu and Fashola until this day.

So,  Lagos state continues to remain an attractive spot for investors and tourists as well as a competitive stronghold to score a political point and without looking further the stability and commitment of Tinubu and Fashola have been pivotal to it. In 2015, it was evident with their combined effort that saw the opposition party All Progressive Congress defeat the PDP in the national election as they echo their popular mantra of continuity. So, it is fair to argue that without democratisation, such analysis like this would not have been feasible. Also, in the absence of a decentralised power, economic opportunities, and innovations would not have been effective.

REFERENCES

  • Channels.TV. (2015). Tinubu, Fashola emphasise Continuity in Lagos with Ambode: {Online}. Available at: https://youtu.be/6RgGX6EmAX8. (Accessed 6th Oct. 2018).
  • Cheeseman, Nic, and Diane de Gramont. “Managing a mega-city: learning the lessons from Lagos.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy33, no. 3 (2017): 457-477.
  • Holston, J. (2009). Insurgent citizenship in an era of global urban peripheries. City & Society21(2), 245-267.
  • Paller J (2017) ‘The contentious politics of African urbanization’ Current History, 116, 790, 163-169.

Week 1: The Primacy Of Politics in Development

 

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This session uncovered the relationship between politics and development. And I understood that they are indeed inextricable of each other in terms of achieving a tangible result. Politics comprises of governance, security and power. And in a great deal, these components are essential to making development a meaningful substance when embarked upon in the Global South. Arguably, this is safe in other to prevent the escalation of conflict in the process of development.

 There is no doubt, development in the Global South should be treated with care and altruism. But the North in their attempt to proffer solution has ended up worsening the situation because it failed to take into consideration the institutions that exist at the grassroots levels. One of this example is the US intervention in Iraq where it failed to achieve its agenda of promoting democracy against a dangerous authoritarian leadership in the Middle East.

Notwithstanding, in this session, what I find most relevant, was the example that was given about the UK being a developed country. To discover that the factors that made the UK become a developed country even though democratic, cannot in its entirety today be replicated in the Global South. If not for the few exceptions such as education and trade. But even with the prospect of education and trade, we still notice the level of poverty and corruption skyrocketing in developing countries. This is an unfortunate circumstance but it is not entirely a surprise because most foreign donors tend to have a benign intention of delivery aid but end up trying to interfere with the domestic politics of the aid-receiving countries. And as such, has received stiff resistance and dislike for their actions as highlighted in Carothers and Gramont work. (Carothers and Gramonth, 2013). This is evident under the presidency of Kenyatta with mounting pressures from foreign donors on him to legalise same-sex marriage as a condition for receiving donor funding of, which he has bluntly declined by saying; “We must ensure that our development is what we want and not that brought from outside. We should not be told that if we want money, we must legislate that a man can marry another,” Uhuru said in Swahili. (Diaspora Messenger, 2018). 

Also, just recently the US President at the United Nations summit this year echoed that; “America will only deliver Aid to his friends and to those who have their interest in hearts”. (PBS NEWSHOUR, 2018).  Indeed,  it clearly underscores the complexity of delivering aid without being political at the international level. And there is hardly any way that these aid-receiving countries will necessarily have the interest of the US in their heart unless for some strategic reasons. But this conditions comes at the expense of those severely and sincerely suffering. Therefore, I will suggest that aid donors be flexible and demonstrate the willingness to engage politically but in a neutral way that will promote greater productivity and potentially focus on pertinent issues for development. Also, strengthen the existing institutions at the grassroots levels for more transparency and accountability against corruption. Then, finally, engage with policymakers to find out plausible alternatives in various public sectors or perhaps programmes that aim to combat societal indifference and extreme educational inequality for economic growth.

REFERENCES

Carothers, T. and de Gramont, D. (2013). Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

Diaspora M. (2018). Uhuru: Rather We Stay Poor Than Legalise Same-Sex Marriages to Get Funding. [online] Diaspora Messenger News Media. Available at: https://diasporamessenger.com/2018/10/uhuru-rather-stay-poor-legalise-sex-marriages-funding/?fbclid=IwAR0yzghgAcOuxxBkBZDyMFzv8cFOFZv-bBxnXIhTC4FMonRBN3bWoauOt0o. [Accessed 25 Oct. 2018].

PBS. Newshour. (2018). The U.S. is the world’s largest giver of foreign aid, Trump says, but ‘few give anything to us’. [online] Available at: https://youtu.be/n80-CG7Ok9w. [Accessed 6 Oct. 2018].